Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Northwest Africa, World War II

82.00

 84.00

توصيل مجاني

احصل عليه خلال 2 - 7 اغسطس

اطلب في غضون 18 ساعة 27 دقيقة

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الناشر	Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
رقم الكتاب المعياري الدولي 10	1500823139
تنسيق الكتاب	Paperback
وصف الكتاب	The 1st Armored Division was the first American armored unit to enter combat against German panzer divisions in World War II. A product of the contentious mechanization process between the First and Second World Wars, the division soon found itself to be outmatched by its German foe. Following a relatively easy victory against the Vichy French after the amphibious landings of Operation Torch, the division lost a series of battles to the Germans, culminating in a decisive defeat at Kasserine Pass. Doctrine (both institutional and equipment), training, and battle command all proved to be problematic for the division. The central question is: Did the 1st Armored Division lose the battle of Kasserine Pass because of deficiencies in American armor doctrine, training, or battle command? An analysis of the Tunisian campaign focusing on these three areas demonstrates that faulty training and inept battle command were partially responsible for the division's defeat; however, the primary reason the 1st Armored Division lost the battle of Kasserine Pass was that it operated in accordance with flawed institutional doctrine and utilized inferior equipment.
عدد الصفحات	98 pages

رقم الكتاب المعياري الدولي 13	9781500823139
الكاتب	U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
اللغة	English
تاريخ النشر	14 August 2014

مجموع السلة  82.00

Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Northwest Africa, World War II

82.00

 84